INTRODUCTION
One of the perennial topics of discussion and study in the field of environmental law is the unusual amount of exemptions or exclusions the oil and gas industry has received from our nation's major environmental laws. For the most part, these laws are broadly applicable and aim at certain environmental impacts and considerations, no matter the source. Yet the oil and gas industry is unique in the amount of exemptions and exclusions it has received-and continues to receive-from these laws. The only other industry that seems to come close is agriculture.
With the recent boom in oil and gas production, along with the increased environmental costs, there has been more focus on the oil and gas industry's treatment under our environmental laws. However, much of this focus is on Congress, both in its role in bringing about these exemptions and exclusions and in legislative solutions toward ending them. In two ways, this article aims to add greater detail and better solutions to this conversation. First, while Congress undoubtedly played a central role in enacting these exemptions and exclusions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") laid much of the groundwork for Congress's enactments and has maintained these exemptions through its long inaction and regulatory inertia. Second, these exemptions are not absolute. Congress's enactment of them did not foreclose all future regulation of the oil and gas industry under those laws. Each exemption either gives EPA the means to end the exemption or contains an exception, thereby giving EPA much fuller ability to regulate the oil and gas industry than it chooses to use.
In making this case, this article will examine three exclusions or exemptions to major environmental laws: the oil and gas extraction industry's continued exclusion from the Toxics Release Inventory ("TRI") 3. See EPA, RIA, supra note 1, at 2-4-2-8; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 2, at 2-4.
pipelines, oil refineries, and certain petrochemical plants, like ethane "cracker" facilities. 4 Within the oil and gas extraction industry, there are two main categories of processes (sometimes broken further down to three): (1) exploration and production at the well site and (2) natural gas processing. 5 The exploration and production category, as its name suggests, begins with exploration for formations associated with oil or natural gas deposits, and involves geophysical prospecting and exploratory drilling. 6 Once this exploration has located an economically recoverable field, well development begins with the drilling of one or more wells. 7 At this stage in the process, operators use a number of drilling muds and fluids, as described in greater detail infra, to clean and cool the drill bit, bring drill cuttings back to the surface, and prevent the collapse of the well bore. 8 Once the well bore has reached a desired depth, the drill bit is steered in order to drill horizontally-usually 1,000 to 6,000 feet outward, but sometimes as far as 10,000 feet from the well. 9 At this point, the process of fracking typically begins, in which millions of gallons of fluids are pumped into the well under high pressuresometimes preceded by a charge to form initial fractures-in order to fracture the surrounding formation and release the oil and gas contained within. 10 As described infra, these fracking fluids also contain a variety of toxic and hazardous constituents, though many such fluids are proprietary 4 .
Major blends for which companies claim protection as trade secrets. 11 Finally, mixtures known as "proppants"-typically sand, but also other materialsare also injected in order to "prop" the fractures open. 12 Once a hydraulically fractured well successfully releases natural gas from the oil and gas formation, the pressure of the natural gas pushes the injected fluids as well as the water previously trapped within the formation out of the well at high velocity, typically into a nearby surface impoundment. 13 Unless this "flowback" is controlled via a "reduced emission completion," it can result in a significant amount of air pollutants venting directly to the atmosphere.
14 Once natural gas has been extracted from a well, it must be processed to the point of becoming "pipeline-quality" gas-that is, the quality at which it can be transported via high-pressure, long-distance pipelines. 15 Natural gas processing (also known as "conditioning") is the series of methods that remove contaminants and natural gas liquids from the gas stream, specifically including water vapor, hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, high-vapor-pressure hydrocarbons such as the BTEX compounds, and other gases such as nitrogen. 16 Two of the most common methods involved in natural gas processing are "dehydration," in which the gas is exposed to a glycol to remove water vapor, and "sweetening," in which the "sour" natural gas is exposed to an amine solution and heated to remove hydrogen sulfide.
17

B. The Toxic Chemicals the Oil and Gas Industry Uses and Releases
In these two processes-exploration and production and natural gas processing-the oil and gas industry uses and releases a host of toxic chemicals. 18 
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Although each statute at issue here uses a different terminology for the regulated substances-e.g., RCRA's "hazardous wastes" and the TRI's "toxic chemicals"-this article will generally use the term "toxic chemicals," which seems the most broadly inclusive.
First, oil and gas exploration and production use a wide range of chemicals to drill and frack wells, mobilize additional chemicals within the oil and gas formations, and release these chemicals across nearly all environmental media. 19 The category that is likely most familiar to the public are the chemicals used in fracking fluids, and one of the best sources on these fluids is a 2011 report by the Minority Staff of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce. 20 The report looked at voluntary submissions by "the 14 leading oil and gas service companies" of the products and chemicals they used between 2005 and 2009. 21 From these submissions, the toxic chemicals most used by the companies, based on number of products in which they appeared, were methanol, 2-butoxyethanol, and ethylene glycol.
22
The report also specifically identified 29 chemicals used by the companies that are known or possible human carcinogens, regulated under SDWA for risks to human health, and/or listed as hazardous air pollutants ("HAPs") under the Clean Air Act. 23 These included diesel, naphthalene, xylene, hydrochloric acid, toluene, ethylbenzene, and formaldehyde. 24 When used as fracking fluids, these products and chemicals are mixed with a base fluid, typically water or reused wastewater, and anywhere between two to five million gallons of this mixture is injected to frack a single well. 25 In addition to fracking fluids, wells use a wide range of muds and fluids for the initial drilling of the wells. One of the most common ingredients in both onshore and offshore drilling muds is barite, which contains primarily barium sulfate but also a host of toxic metals, such as mercury, cadmium, and chromium. 26 Additional toxic constituents used in drilling and other well development practices include propargyl alcohol, a common corrosion 19 27 heavy naphtha, a lubricant that contains the toxic BTEX compounds; 28 and Duratone HT, a filtration control agent for drilling that contains nonylphenol. 29 An additional set of toxic chemicals are those that are already present in the gas formation and will be mobilized as drill cuttings and flowback water. 30 Within the Marcellus shale formation, these chemicals include lead, arsenic, barium, chromium, uranium, radium, radon, and benzene. 31 Drill cuttings can also contain naturally occurring radioactive materials ("NORMs"), which have proven to be a problem for the disposal of these wastes in landfills not capable of handling them.
32
These toxic chemicals are released to all environmental media through a variety of mechanisms. For example, wastewater (i.e., flowback water and produced water) has contaminated groundwater aquifers by leaching through pits and impoundments, faulty well casing, and natural or frackingrelated pathways. 33 Surface water discharges have occurred due to well "blowouts," spills, and other accidents. 34 Contamination of surface water also occurs when oil and gas wastewater is improperly sent to public wastewater treatment plants, which are incapable of removing certain
27.
See constituents such as salts and radioactive materials, and end up releasing these materials into the receiving water.
35
Operators also send oil and gas wastewater to underground injection wells, of which there are now 172,000 nationwide, and which accept two billion gallons of oil and gas wastewater per day. 36 Solid wastes, such as drill cuttings, drilling muds, and fracking sands, are sent to solid waste landfills. 37 This has become a problem over the past several years, as the growing amount of oil and gas solid waste has resulted in many private and municipal landfills receiving oil and gas waste that they are incapable of handling. 38 Finally, air emissions are also a means of release for these wastes, primarily via evaporative loss from wastewater impoundments.
39
The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation recently estimated that a single central impoundment at a well could emit 32.5 tons of methanol per year. 40 Second, natural gas itself contains a large number of toxic constituents, which the oil and gas industry releases through well completions, leaks, storage, and processing. EPA has estimated-prior to its implementation of certain air controls that will partially address the problem-that the industry releases roughly 127,000 tons of hazardous air pollutants annually. 41 EPA has made several estimates of the toxic constituents in natural gas, depending on the gas stream's stage of production or processing. 42 Third, and finally, the industry uses and releases a number of different toxic chemical constituents in its processing of natural gas. For example, dehydrators most commonly use glycols to absorb water from wet gas, including the toxic ethylene glycol. 44 They also emit a significant amount of hazardous air pollutants, and in particular the BTEX compounds, from leaks and venting during their operation. In EPA's recent air rule, it estimated that its controls on small glycol dehydrators would result in an average reduction of 6.8 tons per year of hazardous air pollutants per unit. 45 Gas sweetening commonly uses an amine solution-including the toxic diethanolamine-to remove hydrogen sulfide from "sour gas." 46 The toxic hydrogen sulfide that is recovered from the process is sometimes captured and sold as elemental sulfur, but also may be vented or flared. 47 
II. THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY'S EXEMPTIONS
The oil and gas industry undoubtedly is exempt from a large amount of provisions of environmental laws. Indeed, there are so many exemptions that there are countless articles, guides, and other publications devoted to the topic. 48 This article does not attempt to rebut this point. Rather, through looking at three specific exemptions-the exclusion of the oil and gas
43.
Id. at 8, industry from the TRI, the Halliburton Loophole to SDWA, and the Bentsen Amendment to RCRA-this article aims to add two key points.
First, EPA has played a major role in developing these exemptions and keeping them in place. While Congress enacted the exemptions, EPA had involvement in maintaining the exemptions and, in two cases, laying the groundwork for Congress's enactment. Second, the exemptions are not the end of the story. That is, the passage of additional laws to undo the exemptions is not the only solution; EPA retains great power to undo or lessen the exemptions and to work within them.
That being said, it is helpful to understand the greater context of the oil and gas industry's exemptions. There are a number of other exemptions outside the three discussed in this article, and each is worthy of its own article and set of solutions.
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund") governs the notification and cleanup of hazardous substance releases, including provisions for liable parties, reporting, and the federal "Superfund" that pays for abandoned site cleanup. 49 Given that the law's key provisions hinge on the release of a "hazardous substance" having occurred, 50 Congress wrote CERCLA's hazardous substance definition to broadly incorporate by reference substances deemed hazardous or toxic by other environmental laws. 51 The one exception to this is that the definition "does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance" under the referenced environmental laws, "and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel."
52
This exemption has come to be known as the "petroleum exclusion." 53 In spite of the petroleum exclusion's direct and unique aim at petroleum and natural gas, which "gives oil and gas companies little incentive to prevent and clean up spills," 54 there is room to argue that the exclusion has gaps that could be used to address releases at modern gas wells. Specifically, the natural gas provision of the exclusion does not include the "any fraction thereof" language in the petroleum provision, and it includes the modifier "usable for fuel." As discussed supra, natural gas is not transported to market-i.e., usable for fuel-until processing has removed hydrogen sulfide, a number of other toxic constituents, and natural gas liquids. 55 For this reason, one could argue that a release of unprocessed natural gas or a release of the constituents removed by processing is not exempt and still should trigger CERCLA's liability and notification provisions.
B. The Clean Water Act
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act with the goal "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 56 The primary mechanism by which the Act is meant to achieve this goal is the prohibition on discharges into waters of the United States, unless permitted by EPA or a state permitting authority. 57 Congress supplemented this authority in 1987, adding the ability for EPA and the states to issue permits for stormwater pollution. 58 At the same time, Congress exempted stormwater from "oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or treatment operations or transmission facilities" from these permitting requirements, provided that such stormwater does not come into contact with any wastes on site.
59
After EPA (correctly) read this provision as requiring the permitting of sediment-laden stormwater resulting from the construction of oil and gas sites, Congress amended the Act again, via the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 60 In this amendment, Congress redefined the Clean Water Act's definition of "oil and gas exploration and production" to include construction of oil and gas sites.
61 Under Congress's theory, this would have exempted well pad construction from the Clean Water Act's stormwater permitting, but once again Congress's language did not go far enough to achieve that. Environmental groups challenged the resulting EPA rule that exempted oil and gas construction stormwater on this basis, and Accordingly, even though Congress has made two attempts at exempting it, contaminated stormwater from oil and gas facilities is still covered by the Clean Water Act's permitting requirements.
63
C. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act is the environmental law that regulates emissions from stationary sources, mobile sources, and area sources. 64 The Act achieves this by setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which state environmental agencies meet and implement through their State Implementation Plans, and through the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants.
65
The issue for the oil and gas industry comes about with respect to the Clean Air Act's provision that allows smaller sources to be "aggregated" and regulated as a major source, provided that they are "within a contiguous area" and "under common control." 66 This is important, given that these smaller sources collectively may have a large hazardous emissions footprint without individually meeting the required thresholds for regulation under the Clean Air Act.
67
While this aggregation provision would seem to be appropriate for the regulation of large groups of oil and gas wells operated by one company, 68 the Clean Air Act specifically exempts oil and gas wells, compressor stations, and pump stations from aggregation as major sources, "whether or not such units are in a contiguous area or under common control."
69 The Act also exempts most oil and gas wells from consideration by EPA as small "area sources," another means by which EPA could attempt to regulate the wells. 70 Congress added an additional exemption in 1991 when it struck hydrogen sulfide from the list of hazardous air pollutants. Hydrogen sulfide is a common pollutant at oil and gas operations that produce "sour" gas, and it has particularly dangerous human health impacts, including rapid death.
72
For these reasons, most oil and gas wells are effectively exempt from the Clean Air Act's hazardous emissions regulations.
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D. The National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") establishes the decision-making framework for considering a "federal action's" alternatives and full range of environmental impacts. 74 This is important for oil and gas operations, as many of them occur on federal lands and are therefore federal projects. In 2005, the Energy Policy Act-which also enacted exemptions under the Clean Water Act and SDWA-enacted an exemption under NEPA for certain oil and gas exploration and development occurring on lands managed by the Department of the Interior or the Department of Agriculture. 75 Under this exemption, there is a "rebuttable presumption" that such activities should be considered a "categorical exclusion" and therefore not given the full analysis under NEPA. 76 The effect is that these oil and gas activities on federal public lands may go forward without a proper analysis of their reasonable alternatives, impacts, and effects.
E. The Exemptions Investigated in this Article: TRI, SDWA, and RCRA
This article will examine exemptions and exclusions under three other environmental laws toward demonstrating the premises that EPA has played a key role in implementing and maintaining these exemptions and that there is still much that EPA can do on its own to undo these exemptions and work within them.
First, the oil and gas industry's exclusion from the TRI is the least of the three like a "traditional" exemption, and it is also the one in which EPA maintains the most power to act. Second, the Halliburton Loophole of SDWA is the most like a traditional exemption and the one in which EPA has the least discretion. At the same time, EPA laid much of the groundwork for the exemption, and it still has authority to work within the exemption, which it has used in only the barest way. Third, the Bentsen Amendment to RCRA is a complicated middle ground between the first two. Congress enacted the exemption on the basis of EPA's reasoning, but it also provided EPA with certain ways to undo or work within the exemption. For nearly three decades, EPA has opted not to use either of these mechanisms.
III. THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY
The first exemption this article considers-the TRI-is also the simplest of the three and the least like a traditional exemption. For this same reason, it is also the one over which EPA has the most control and the least restrictions. To state it in the simplest terms, the oil and gas industryor, more specifically, the oil and gas extraction industry, as defined suprais not currently one of the industry sectors whose facilities must comply with the TRI.
77
This is because when Congress enacted the TRI as part of EPCRA in 1986, it did not include the oil and gas extraction industry among the list of industries required to report. At the same time, Congress did not exclude the industry from future addition. Rather, Congress left EPA with wholly unrestricted power to add the oil and gas extraction industry or any other industry sector to the TRI as the agency saw fit.
Since the TRI's enactment, EPA has only added additional industries to the TRI once, when it added seven sectors in 1997. Among the sectors that EPA deferred adding was the oil and gas extraction industry. While EPA stated at that time that it would revisit the oil and gas extraction industry in the future, it has never done so, nor has it formally added or considered any additional industry sectors since then. In a way, because EPA has unrestricted yet unused power, this is the clearest example of this article's themes: (1) the exemption's force is sustained entirely by EPA's inaction, and (2) there is still much that EPA can do to improve the oil and gas extraction industry's regulation under the TRI.
77.
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A. How We Got Here: The Oil and Gas Extraction Industry's Continued Exclusion from the TRI
Congress enacted the TRI as section 313 of EPCRA in 1986. 78 EPCRA was largely "in response to concerns regarding the environmental and safety hazards posed by the storage and handling of toxic chemicals," which had come about in the aftermath of the 1984 "Bhopal disaster." 79 In that case, a Union Carbide pesticide manufacturing plant accidentally released a cloud of methyl isocyanate gas, killing nearly 4,000 people and injuring tens of thousands more. 80 A subsequent toxic chemical release from a similar Union Carbide chemical plant in West Virginia solidified the call for a greater public "right to know" and better emergency planning, leading to EPCRA's 1986 passage.
81
As enacted, section 313 of EPCRA requires facilities within certain industry sectors to report their annual releases of certain toxic chemicals to the TRI, provided the facilities used over a certain threshold amount of each chemical to be reported and employed ten or more regular employees. 82 As of the date of this article's publication, "[t]he current TRI toxic chemical list contains 594 individually-listed chemicals and 31 chemical categories (including four categories containing 68 specifically-listed chemicals)," for a total of 689 TRI-listed chemicals and chemical categories.
83
Congress initially applied the TRI's requirements only to facilities within the manufacturing industry sectors, as identified by Standard Industrial Classification Codes ("SIC Codes") 20 through 39, likely due to the role of manufacturing plants as impetus for EPCRA. 84 At the same time, Congress gave EPA the ability to add (or delete) industry sectors as the 78 agency saw fit, provided that such addition or deletion "is relevant to the purposes of this section."
85
In other words, EPA has broad authority to add any additional SIC Codes to the requirements of the TRI, bound only by the directive that any such addition be relevant to the purposes of the TRI. As articulated by EPA, the purposes of the TRI program are also broad: " (1) [p]roviding a complete profile of toxic chemical releases and other waste management activities; (2) compiling a broad-based national database for determining the success of environmental regulations; and (3) ensuring that the public has easy access to these data on releases of toxic chemicals to the environment." 86 In spite of this nearly unrestricted authority, EPA did not act on it for almost ten years after the enactment of EPCRA. Then, in 1995, President Clinton issued a memorandum to EPA entitled "Expediting Community Right-to-Know Initiatives," in which the President noted his "commit[ment] to the effective implementation of this law" and EPA's "substantial authority to add to the Toxics Release Inventory under EPCRA . . . new classes of industrial facilities."
87 For this reason, President Clinton directed EPA to continue rulemaking to add to the list of TRI industry sectors "on an expedited basis" and to complete this rulemaking "on an accelerated schedule." 88 EPA followed on this directive in 1996 with a proposed rule in which the agency proposed to add seven new industry sectors to the TRI. 89 Specifically, EPA proposed to add the metal mining, coal mining, electric utilities, commercial hazardous waste treatment, chemicals and allied products-wholesale, petroleum bulk stations-wholesale, and solvent recovery services industry sectors. 90 EPA chose these seven sectors through an in-depth screening process, starting first with the overall group of non- From there, EPA reviewed the data available to determine the volume of TRI-listed toxic chemicals used and released by each sector. Over 99% of the chemicals released came from 25 industry sectors, which EPA called the "Tier I" list.
92
Rather than just adding these 25 sectors, thereby covering the vast majority of toxic chemical releases not yet reported to the TRI and arguably fulfilling both President Clinton's directive and the purposes of the TRI, EPA decided to narrow the list further. To do so, the agency looked at the manufacturing industry sectors already covered by the TRI and compared these to the 25 Tier I sectors, in order to determine "those industries that either supply or otherwise manage chemicals and related materials both to and from the point of manufacturing." EPA's rationale was that "fill[ing] in gaps associated with chemical management activities currently reported" was a "primary objective" of its rulemaking. 93 This resulted in narrowing the sectors to ten candidates.
Again, EPA did not simply add the industry sectors from this smaller list, but continued to screen the candidate sectors against a further series of considerations, including "overlay of regulatory definitions and developments, existing program guidance, and any exemptions pertinent to activities identified for the primary candidates," and input from representatives of the industry sectors. 94 Finally, "after the application of the screening process," EPA used several "additional considerations" to exclude certain industry sectors. 95 It was one of these additional considerations that resulted in EPA deferring the addition of the oil and gas extraction sector. 96 While EPA "believed" that the oil and gas extraction industry "conduct[ed] significant management activities that involve EPCRA section 313 chemicals," it opted to "defer[] action to add this industry group at this time because of questions regarding how particular facilities should be identified." This industry group is unique in that it may have related activities located over significantly large geographic areas. While together these activities may involve the 91.
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management of significant quantities of EPCRA section 313 chemicals in addition to requiring significant employee involvement, taken at the smallest unit (individual well), neither the employee nor the chemical thresholds are likely to be met.
98
EPA stated that it "will be addressing these issues in the future," and ultimately opted not to include the oil and gas extraction industry in the group of industry sectors proposed for addition to the TRI.
99
Although EPA did not explicitly say so, the question of how to define facilities within the oil and gas extraction industry ties in directly with a set of three primary factors that EPA also developed in the proposed rule "to consider in determining whether the statutory standard would be met by addition of the candidate facilities in industry groups under EPCRA section 313(b)(1)(B)." 100 As discussed earlier, Congress provided EPA with broad authority to add industry sectors to the TRI, subject only to the requirement that such addition be "relevant to the purposes of" the TRI.
101 EPA agreed this discretion was "broad," echoing a strong sentiment put forward by the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO") in an earlier report that critiqued EPA's failure to use this authority.
102 But EPA apparently had expressed "concerns" about using this authority and later, in the final rule, characterized its authority as "not unlimited." 103 For this reason, EPA interpreted the language of the statute to develop three factors it would use in deciding whether to add a candidate industry to the TRI: (a) "Whether one or more toxic chemicals are reasonably anticipated to be present at facilities within the candidate industry group" (the "chemical factor"); (b) "whether facilities within the candidate industry group 'manufacture,' 'process,' or 'otherwise use' these toxic chemicals" (the "activity factor"); and (c) "whether facilities within the candidate industry group can reasonably be anticipated to increase the information 98 made available pursuant to EPCRA section 313, or otherwise further the purposes of EPCRA section 313" (the "information factor").
104
The first and second factors are seemingly straightforward, and EPA found that the oil and gas extraction industry clearly met them. 105 The problem seems to have been that, if "facilities" are defined as the smallest possible units-individual wells-then these facilities may not exceed the necessary chemical or employee thresholds needed for a facility to require reporting. 106 This issue ties in with the "information factor" since the addition of an industry is meant to give the public more information. If facilities within a candidate industry will not actually report to the TRI because they cannot meet the reporting thresholds, EPA's theory is that this would weigh against the industry's addition to the TRI.
107
Even though it may be useful for purposes of rulemaking to have these factors, using the "information factor" in this way seems like an unnecessary constraint on EPA's authority and is at odds with the overall purposes of the TRI. For example, even if individual oil and gas wells fit within the proper definition of "facilities," and this results in the majority or entirety of the industry not reporting to the TRI, it still does not make sense for EPA to exclude the entire industry sector from the TRI. If just one facility from the industry were to report to the TRI, this would certainly increase the information made available to the public.
Congress did not command EPA to only add industry sectors that have a certain number of reporting facilities. Rather, Congress left the decision completely up to EPA, so long as the addition would further the purposes of the TRI. 108 Indeed, many of the industries that Congress added in its own original sweep of SIC Codes 20 through 39 have very few reporting units. For example, in reporting year 2013, the apparel industry sector only had three reporting facilities, and the leather manufacturing industry sector only had 27 reporting facilities. 109 In fact, even industries that EPA chose to add in the 1996-97 rulemaking have less than 100 reporting facilities: coal mining had 59 facilities in reporting year 2013, and metal mining had 88. As demonstrated infra, the oil and gas extraction industry has at least hundreds of large facilities that would report to the TRI, if not thousands.
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As the GAO stated in its 1991 report:
[TRI] data must be as comprehensive as possible, with the data from additional emissions sources and on additional toxic chemicals. The concerns EPA expressed should be carefully considered. However, these concerns should not override efforts to make the inventory more comprehensive-especially since policymakers and the public need the data to establish environmental priorities and to better measure progress in reducing pollution.
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Of course, it would be useful for EPA to make a decision on how facilities within a specific industry should be defined, so that it can assist operators in determining whether and how facilities should report. This is a procedural consideration though, and should not keep EPA from adding an industry sector to the TRI, particularly where that sector "conduct[s] significant management activities that involve [toxic] chemicals." 113 In any case, EPA opted not to include the oil and gas extraction industry sector in its 1996 proposed rulemaking and, in spite of its intention to "address[] these issues in the future," has not formally reconsidered the industry since then. 114 In fact, the addition of the seven industry sectors in the 1997 final rulemaking was the only time EPA has added any industries to the TRI.
Although EPA has "broad authority" to add industry sectors to the TRI, and it has received encouragement from the President and the GAO to use this authority freely, it has only done so once in the TRI's nearly 30 year history.
B. Ways Forward: How EPA Can Undo the TRI Exclusion
From the history of the TRI, the first premise of this article is apparent: the continued exclusion of the oil and gas extraction industry from the TRI is mostly-if not entirely-due to EPA. Unlike the exemptions under
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Proposed Sector Addition Rule, supra note 89, at 33,593 (quoting GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TOXIC CHEMICALS: EPA'S TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY IS USEFUL BUT CAN BE IMPROVED (1991)) (emphasis added).
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SDWA and RCRA, discussed infra, Congress' exclusion of the oil and gas extraction industry from the TRI was merely a starting point, not an exemption. 115 Congress left EPA with virtually unlimited authority to add the oil and gas extraction industry or any other industry sector to the TRI, subject only to the requirement that such addition be relevant to the purposes of the TRI. For reasons known only to EPA, the agency has used this authority exactly once in almost 30 years.
Turning to the second premise of this article, there is much that EPA can do to improve the TRI exclusion. In fact, unlike SDWA and RCRA, EPA can completely undo the oil and gas industry's exclusion. There are no external restrictions to EPA's ability to act. If it so chose, it could propose rulemaking to add the industry tomorrow. This is what EPA recently appears to have been doing--albeit in very early and informal stages--for several other industry sectors that were excluded in 1996. In late 2011, EPA commenced an online "discussion forum" in order to "define the scope of a potential forthcoming rule" for the addition of six industry sectors to the TRI: "Iron Ore Mining, Phosphate Mining, Solid Waste Combustors and Incinerators, Large Dry Cleaning, Petroleum Bulk Storage, and Steam Generation from Coal and/or Oil." 116 Notably, all but one of these six sectors in the discussion forum were either sectors that EPA previously had deferred adding-like the oil and gas extraction industry-or expansions of sectors added in the 1996 and 1997 rulemakings. 117 Although the oil and gas extraction industry was not included among these six sectors, one commenting organization noted the absence of significant contributors, such as the oil and gas extraction industry, and recommended that "EPA should take immediate steps to review and add such polluting industry sectors to TRI."
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On October 24, 2012, the Environmental Integrity Project and sixteen other organizations made this request formally, submitting a "Petition to Add the Oil and Gas Extraction Industry, Standard Industrial Classification Code 13, to the List of Facilities Required to Report under the Toxics Release Inventory" ("Petition") to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson. 119 The Petition specifically requested that EPA revisit its 1996 decision and initiate formal rulemaking to add the oil and gas extraction industry to the list of industry sectors required to report to the TRI. In particular, the Petition noted that, even if EPA had made the correct decision in 1996 (to omit oil and gas extraction from the TRI), the industry had changed and expanded so much in the intervening decade and a half to warrant its addition to the TRI. 120 The Petition addressed EPA's chemical and activity factors, noting the wide variety of chemicals used and released in drilling, fracking, natural gas processing, and other industry activities and facilities.
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With respect to the "information factor," the Petition approached this in three main ways. First, the Petition addressed the existing federal and state laws that cover the oil and gas industry, noting in particular the number of exemptions in federal laws, the lack of uniformity in state disclosure rules, and therefore how the industry's addition to the TRI would greatly increase public information.
122 Second, the Petition looked specifically at well pads as individual facilities and the amount of TRI-listed toxic chemicals they use that exceed the TRI's 10,000-pound chemical threshold. For example, the Petition noted that individual Marcellus shale wells have released as much as 26,000 pounds of methanol across all environmental media. 123 Third, the Petition addressed the question of whether multiple well pads could constitute a single facility. To this end, the Petition considered certain areas, such as Dimock, Pennsylvania, and the Jonah Field of Wyoming, in which single oil and gas operators collectively operate large, concentrated groups of well pads. For example, the Petition noted that Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation operated nearly 140 wells within a 3.5-mile radius in Dimock, Pennsylvania.
124 Similarly, Encana Oil and Gas USA, Inc. operated over 1,700 wells on Wyoming's Jonah Field, with 90 of these wells located within just one square mile.
125
In a submission to the Petition's regulatory docket in January 2014, Petitioners addressed the information factor from another angle: that there are hundreds if not thousands of large facilities in the oil and gas extraction industry that are clearly well-defined facilities and would certainly exceed 120.
Id. at 9. 121.
Id. at 22-24 (describing how the industry meets the factors generally), 25-30 (describing constituents of natural gas), 30-32 (describing chemicals used and released in processing), 32-56 (describing chemicals used and released in well development).
122.
Id. at 60-66.
123.
Id. at 77-78. 124.
TRI PETITION, supra note 19, at 68-69.
125.
Id. at 70.
the chemical thresholds. 126 Looking at a sample of six states with a large oil and gas industry presence, Petitioners reviewed air emissions data reported by certain oil and gas facilities, such as natural gas processing plants, compressor stations, natural gas liquid fractionators, and wastewater processing facilities.
127 From this data, Petitioners found that nearly 400 facilities released at least one TRI-listed toxic chemical above the chemical threshold on an annual basis, clearly enough reporting facilities that the information to the public would be greatly increased by the industry's addition.
128
These numbers are even more notable if one considers: (1) that these facilities are within just six states, and (2) because only emissions data was available, Petitioners calculated the threshold numbers from the chemicals released by the facilities, rather than the chemicals used. 129 The TRI requires that the threshold calculation be based on the chemicals used, a number which is invariably much higher than the ultimate amount released.
130 If Petitioners had the data on the amount of chemicals used by the facilities (i.e., the "throughput"), the number of facilities exceeding the chemical threshold would undoubtedly be much higher.
131
The letter also noted a matter of arbitrariness at the heart of the oil and gas extraction industry's exclusion from the TRI. That is, the TRI covers (or excludes) industry facilities on the basis of their SIC Codes, and the SIC Codes, as a matter of necessity, have drawn lines between certain processes and facilities. 132 For this reason, certain downstream oil and gas facilities are required to report--such as oil refineries and ethane steam cracking facilities--because their SIC Codes are within the set of manufacturing sectors.
133 Slightly upstream, the facilities within the oil and gas extraction industry that provide the oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids that serve as the feedstock for refineries and petrochemical plants need not report to the TRI. 134 The public is able to access TRI reports from one part of the supply chain, but not the other. EPA's continued choice to exclude SIC Code 13-the oil and gas extraction industry-perpetuates this arbitrariness.
On January 7, 2015, over two years after filing the Petition with no formal response from EPA, Petitioners filed a lawsuit against EPA for its "unreasonable delay" in making this required response. 135 On
136 While this does not guarantee that EPA will finally add the oil and gas extraction industry to the TRI, it would be the first formal action taken by the agency with respect to the oil and gas extraction industry-or, for that matter, for any industry sector currently excluded from the TRI-for the first time in almost 20 years.
The oil and gas extraction industry's exclusion from the TRI is the least like an "exemption," in the traditional sense, of the three statutes discussed in this article. Congress did not specifically exempt the oil and gas extraction industry from the TRI's coverage, but rather added the manufacturing sectors and gave EPA nearly unlimited authority to add the remaining industry sectors. In nearly 30 years, EPA has used this broad authority exactly once, and even then it sought out ways in which it could narrow and add constraints to this authority to make a small and limited addition of sectors.
In this way, one can see that EPA bears almost complete responsibility for implementing, maintaining, and failing to undo this particular exemption of the oil and gas industry.
IV. THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT AND THE "HALLIBURTON LOOPHOLE"
The second exemption explored here is the most in line with what one expects of an oil and gas industry exemption. In 2005, Congress specifically amended SDWA to exclude fracking from the definition of "underground injection," thereby exempting it from SDWA's Underground Injection Control ("UIC") program. 137 The in place is where fracking uses diesel fuel. 138 For this reason, of the three exemptions explored in this article, the SDWA exemption is the one that EPA has the least discretion to undo. Absent a subsequent amendment by Congress, EPA is stuck with this very limited authority for the foreseeable future.
That being said, this exemption also clearly demonstrates this article's premise: first, EPA paved the way for this exemption. It avoided using its SDWA authority to regulate fracking for decades, strongly argued against the fact that it possessed this authority, and drafted a report demonstrating why the authority was unnecessary. 139 Congress's enactment of the exemption merely fulfilled what EPA had been attempting to do for decades. Second, even under this exemption, EPA has unused authority. Namely, EPA has the ability and responsibility to regulate fracking that uses diesel fuel. In the ten years since the enactment of the exemption, however, neither EPA nor the state agencies have issued a single UIC permit to a fracking operation that uses diesel fuel.
In short, while the surface-level perception of the SDWA exemption may be that it was an injustice done by Congress at the behest of oil and gas interests, the story both leading up to, and since, the exemption entirely belongs to EPA.
A. How We Got Here: The Road to the Halliburton Loophole
Congress enacted SDWA in 1974, with the goal of protecting the quality of public drinking water.
140
Because of the importance of groundwater sources of drinking water, Part C of SDWA established the UIC program and required EPA to promulgate minimum standards for state UIC programs. 141 In order for a state to administer its own UIC program, including permitting and enforcement, it must demonstrate to EPA that it is capable of meeting these minimum requirements. 142 Included within these minimum requirements is the requirement that the state "shall prohibit . . . any underground injection . . . which is not authorized by a permit issued by 138 For the purposes of the eventual exemption, the problem arose in that a plain reading of this definition appears to include fracking. From SDWA's 1974 enactment until the 1990s, however, neither EPA nor the states regulated fracking under the UIC program. 145 Simultaneously, fracking was beginning to find a niche as a key technique to increase natural gas production from coalbed methane ("CBM") formations.
146 Within a few years, the number of CBM wells in the United States had increased rapidly, from less than 100 wells in 1984 to over 8,000 wells in 1990. 147 Because of this rapid growth and lack of any permitting under the State of Alabama's UIC program, the environmental organization Legal Environmental Assistance Federation ("LEAF") petitioned EPA in 1994 to withdraw its approval of Alabama's program.
148 LEAF specifically raised the minimum requirement that a state must prohibit any underground injection that "is not authorized by a permit issued by the State."
149 Given that Alabama neither permitted fracking under its UIC program, nor prohibited it without such a permit, LEAF claimed that Alabama's UIC program violated this minimum requirement.
150
In 1995, EPA denied LEAF's petition on the grounds that fracking did not fall within SDWA's definition of "underground injection."
151 In EPA's view, the definition covered "only those wells whose 'principal function' is the underground emplacement of fluids."
152 Because CBM wells' principal function is the production of natural gas, EPA asserted that they did not fall under the definition. court determined that "hydraulic fracturing obviously falls within this definition, as it involves the subsurface emplacement of fluids by forcing them into cracks in the ground through a well." 155 The court found EPA's "principal function" argument to be unpersuasive, noting the "plain meaning of the definition" and the lack of any authority in the statute to suggest that EPA should be allowed to exclude an activity on the basis that the well is used for another activity as well. 156 Additionally, although the court believed that the plain meaning of the statute was enough to decide the case, it briefly entertained EPA's arguments regarding the legislative history of SDWA, noting that "far from evidencing a legislative intent contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, the legislative history supports it" and that "Congress intended to cast a wide regulatory net in enacting the UIC program." 157 On this basis, the court found EPA's grounds for denying LEAF's petition to be invalid and remanded the petition to EPA. 158 While EPA reinitiated its review of Alabama's UIC program in compliance with this order, it also began to work on a report "to evaluate the environmental risks to underground sources of drinking water from hydraulic fracturing practices associated with CBM production."
159 Perhaps unsurprisingly for an agency that sought to avoid SDWA regulation of fracking for decades, the report concluded that fracking "poses little or no threat" to underground sources of drinking water and that no further study was required. 160 The one area of concern EPA identified was that "[t]he use of diesel fuel in fracturing fluids poses the greatest potential threat to USDWs because the BTEX constituents in diesel fuel exceed the [federal drinking water maximum contaminant level] at the point-of-injection." 161 Much like the RCRA Report to Congress and Regulatory Determination discussed infra, a number of gaps and contradictions existed in EPA's CBM report. 162 First, EPA found that "very little documented research had been done on the environmental impacts of injecting fracturing fluids," an admission that not only points to a data gap in the report, but 155 .
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Id also seems at odds with the conclusion that no further study is necessary. 163 Second, EPA limited the focus of its report just to fracking of CBM formations and "did not review the use of hydraulic fracturing in other geologic formations, such as the Marcellus Shale or other tight oil and gas formations." 164 In part because of these gaps and contradictions, the report received a large amount of criticism from "internal staff, federal legislators, and respected peers," including claims that the report was unsupportable and scientifically unsound. 165 In particular, one EPA scientist wrote a letter to Congress and the EPA Inspector General, noting that "EPA has conducted limited research reaching the unsupported conclusion that this industry practice needs no further study at this time." 166 Roughly a year later, Congress largely "codified [the report's] finding" when it amended SDWA as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 167 The amendment modified the definition of "underground injection" to add the following exclusions:
(B) excludes-(i) the underground injection of natural gas for purposes of storage; and (ii) the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities. 168 This exemption has come to be known as the "Halliburton Loophole," after Vice President Dick Cheney's former position as CEO of the oil and gas services company Halliburton, which pioneered fracking and continues to be a major manufacturer of fracking fluids, as well as the purported role that Cheney's Energy Task Force played in the exemption. 169 
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Brady With the exemption in place, it was now clear that EPA lacked authority under SDWA to require UIC permits for fracking operations. At the same time, it was also clear that EPA could require such permits of operations that fracked with diesel fuels. Yet it was not until February 2014, nine years after the passage of the Energy Policy Act, that EPA finally issued guidance on what compounds actually constituted "diesel fuels" and how state agencies should permit these operations. 170 Even though it was now responsible for just a small piece of its SDWA authority over fracking, EPA still took nearly a decade to issue the guidance that state agencies needed to permit and regulate the types of operations that EPA saw as such a "potential threat" in 2004. In fact, there was a stretch of years during which "EPA took no official position regarding the regulation of hydraulic fracturing using diesel fuel under the SDWA."
171 As of December 2014, neither EPA nor state agencies with delegated authority have issued any permits to operations that frack with diesel fuel.
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B. Ways Forward: How EPA Can Work Within and Around the Halliburton Loophole's Fracking Exemption
As the SDWA exemption is a congressionally enacted exemption that leaves no authority for EPA to "undo" it in any way-unlike the TRI or, to some extent, RCRA-it will remain in place unless a future Congress chooses to lift it. Over the years, there have been several attempts to pass such a bill--most recently via an amendment introduced by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand to the Senate's Keystone XL pipeline bill in January 2015--but these bills have not yet made much headway. 173 That said, EPA still has SDWA authority over the oil and gas industry in two major ways. 174 In fact, given this clear authority, any state that fails to permit such operations and prohibit unpermitted operations is in violation of the minimum requirements for delegated programs, as discussed supra in the context of the LEAF case. 175 As of December 2014, however, neither EPA nor the state agencies have used this authority to issue a single permit to such operations. 176 This would not be a problem if fracking operations no longer used diesel, as industry representatives have repeatedly asserted for years. 177 However, based on a recent review of the industry's own disclosure reports, there are still hundreds of wells that have used diesel fuel as part of their fracking fluids in the last four years. In August 2014, the Environmental Integrity Project published a report in which it reviewed thousands of selfreported disclosures by oil and gas operators to FracFocus, the industry's preferred disclosure mechanism and database. 178 The organization compared these disclosures against the five chemicals that EPA had identified as constituting "diesel fuel" in its February 2014 guidance and found that 351 wells in 12 states used at least one of these products between 2010 and mid-2014.
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The organization then contacted each of the state agencies responsible for UIC permitting in those states, as well as Region 3 of EPA, which retains primacy for UIC permitting in Pennsylvania, and found that "no permit applications had been received and no permits had been issued for any of the [351] wells." 180 In a follow-up investigation several months later, the Environmental Integrity Project further investigated the FracFocus reports, looking specifically for fracking products known to contain one of the five diesel fuel chemicals and finding an additional 243 wells fracked with these products between 2011 and August 2014. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 177.
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Id. at 19, n. This is clearly a problem of EPA's own making. After the enactment of the Halliburton Loophole and the diesel exception, EPA finally had the clarity-and the limited authority-that it desired. Yet rather than acting quickly to promulgate the necessary regulations or guidance to ensure that state authorities could implement and enforce this authority, EPA waited and "took no official position" for years.
182 During this time, the agency failed even to use its own implementation and enforcement authority in states in which it retained primacy, such as Pennsylvania.
183
In 2010, EPA admitted that fracking with diesel was subject to the permitting requirements for Class II UIC wells, but did not propose to revise the minimum requirements for state UIC programs at that time or to issue any guidance in the interim. 184 In 2012, EPA chose to issue draft guidance rather than full regulations, and followed with the final version of this guidance in February 2014. 185 In fact, the final guidance narrowed the proposed guidance's coverage: from six chemicals-as well as their "associated common synonyms"-to just five chemicals, identified only by their Chemical Abstracts Services Registry Numbers. 186 The distinction is important, since what actually constitutes "diesel fuel" is a surprisingly broad category of substances, with a variety of different product names and synonyms. 187 To improve this situation, in which hundreds of wells use diesel fuels and still do not have UIC permits, EPA simply needs to act. As a permitting authority in states where it retains primacy, EPA can finally start to issue UIC permits to wells that continue to frack with diesel. In states with delegated authority, EPA must use its oversight power to ensure that those states are issuing UIC permits to wells that require them. If those states choose not to issue such permits, they are not meeting the minimum requirements of a delegated UIC program, and must revoke their authority. 188 Finally, EPA should revise its UIC and state program regulations.
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The guidance is a good step in the right direction, but EPA should formally revise the regulations to clarify what is required for the permitting and regulation of wells fracked with diesel and to ensure that all state programs must comply with these requirements. 
EPA Must Improve its Regulation of Wastewater Injection Wells
Another area in which EPA can still act in the aftermath of the Halliburton Loophole is in its regulation and oversight of the UIC program for Class II injection wells. Class II wells are defined by the fact that they accept injection of oil and gas wastewater: i.e., the "flowback" and "produced water" that returns to the surface during drilling and fracking operations. 190 Class II wells accept this wastewater for two primary purposes: "enhanced recovery" of oil and gas through the injection of wastewater and permanent disposal of wastewater.
191 Although fracking is a type of enhanced recovery, the Halliburton Loophole only exempted "hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities" from the UIC program.
192 EPA continues to have its full authority over Class II wells used for disposal and enhanced recovery, so long as fracking for oil and gas production is not involved.
193
The reason these Class II wells are important is because of the large and increasing role they play in accepting wastewater from fracking operations. Each day, the nation's 172,000 Class II wells accept at least two billion gallons of oil and gas production wastewater. 194 This wastewater contains the full range of fracking fluids discussed supra, as well as chemicals from the oil and gas formations, such as chlorides, lead, arsenic, and naturally occurring radioactive materials. 195 These wells have proliferated in just the last decade, as oil and gas operators have sought out new ways to dispose of the millions of gallons of wastewater associated with fracking.
196 One unexpected result of this increased use of Class II wells has been the number of earthquakes caused by the wells' "induced seismicity." 197 The Class II program and the problems it seeks to address are not new, however. For example, in EPA's 1988 Regulatory Determination under RCRA, discussed infra, the agency specifically relied on the capabilities of the UIC program as a reason that increased regulation of oil and gas wastes under RCRA was not necessary. 198 At the same time, EPA recognized that improvements to the UIC program were necessary to address certain gaps that the agency had identified. 199 In June 2014, the GAO published a report in which it reviewed EPA's oversight of the Class II program. 200 The GAO found two specific deficiencies, on which it urged EPA to take action. First, the GAO found that EPA was not consistently conducting annual on-site reviews of state programs, as is required by EPA's own guidance. 201 Such reviews are important, given the key role that state agencies with delegated authority play in implementing and enforcing the Class II UIC program. At present, 39 states have delegated authority to administer their own Class II UIC programs. 202 EPA responded that it did not have the funding to conduct such annual reviews as required by the guidance. In turn, the GAO urged EPA to revise its guidance. Given that the guidance was last revised in 1983, a new revision could modernize such evaluations and make them more efficient, while also "identify[ing] priority activities that are needed to oversee programs and ensure their effectiveness." 203 At the very least, such a modern revision would ensure "that state class II programs are being managed effectively and . . . achieving their purpose of protecting underground sources of drinking water. 204 Second, the GAO found that EPA was also not keeping its regulations up to date to incorporate state program requirements. 205 While EPA largely relies on the states to conduct their own enforcement, there are instances in which EPA must step in, either of its own initiative or at a state's request. In those cases, EPA is only able to enforce those state requirements that it has incorporated into its own regulations. 206 In certain cases, EPA "never incorporated any state program requirements into federal regulations." 207 EPA's rejoinder was that the incorporation process is "burdensome and time-consuming," but the GAO pointed out that the incorporation requirement is one that EPA imposed on itself. If it so desired, EPA could revise its regulations to make this process much easier and streamlined. 208 According to EPA officials, however, the agency "has not evaluated alternatives to its current approval process." 209 These are two actions by which EPA could greatly improve its Class II UIC program and ensure that the two billion gallons of oil and gas wastewater injected every day are handled safely and effectively and do not endanger sources of drinking water. EPA needs no congressional authorization to conduct these actions; of its own accord, it could issue the revised guidance document rapidly and the revised regulations within a year or two. For better or worse, the discretion lies wholly with EPA.
Of the three exemptions discussed in this article, the Halliburton Loophole is the most "classic" exemption: Congress clearly took away most of EPA's UIC authority over fracking and left it with no regulatory mechanism to undo the exemption. It is easy to frame Congress as the bully here, acting at the behest of Vice President Cheney's oil and gas interests and unilaterally taking away EPA's ability to protect the public from fracking. But it is not that simple.
First, EPA laid the groundwork for the Halliburton Loophole. Over 30 years, the agency avoided acting on its authority, legally interpreted SDWA in a way to show that it should not have this authority, and then published a scientifically unsound report to demonstrate why it did not need this authority. Even after Congress cut this authority down to a manageable piece, EPA still would not act for another ten years.
Second, the enactment of the Halliburton Loophole is not the end of the story. While it would be most ideal for the protection of the public if Congress later chooses to close the loophole, there is still much that can be done within the limited authority left by the Loophole. EPA and the delegated states can finally issue permits for fracking operations that use diesel and prohibit any such operations without permits. EPA can also act in the areas that the Halliburton Loophole left untouched, improving the Class II UIC program to better regulate the billions of gallons of fracking wastewater injected underground every day across the nation.
V. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
The final exemption considered in this article is the exemption of wastes associated with oil and natural gas exploration and production ("E&P") from regulation under the hazardous waste provisions of RCRA.
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Id. at 45. [VOL. 16 This exemption falls somewhere between the very traditional exemption of the Halliburton Loophole and the more liberal TRI exemption. Because of its place as a "middle-ground" exemption, the exemption under RCRA is a complicated one. The exemption is a statutory one, enacted by Congress in order to constrain EPA's authority over E&P wastes. However, Congress also left EPA with a mechanism to undo the exemption, as well as authority to regulate E&P wastes under RCRA's non-hazardous provisions. In spite of the exemption's complicated nature, the two themes remain at play: (1) the exemption's force is sustained in large part by decades of EPA inaction, and (2) as a consequence of this, there is still much that can be done to improve regulation of E&P wastes.
A. How We Got Here: The Bentsen Amendment and EPA's Regulatory Determination
The complicated story of the E&P waste exemption begins in 1976, when Congress amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 to enact RCRA. 210 RCRA most notably differed from the prior Solid Waste Disposal Act in its addition of the hazardous waste provisions under Subtitle C, which provided for what has become known as "cradle-tograve" management of hazardous wastes.
211
To this end, Congress mandated that, within 18 months of RCRA's enactment, EPA would "promulgate regulations identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and listing particular hazardous wastes" that would be subject to the provisions of Subtitle C.
212
EPA responded to this mandate in 1978, proposing regulations not only for identifying and managing hazardous wastes, but also identifying a set of "special wastes" for which EPA would defer regulation under the hazardous waste provisions until it had conducted additional studies.
213 These "special wastes" fell into six main categories:
1. Cement kiln dust; 2. Utility waste (e.g., coal ash); 3. Phosphate mining waste; 4. Uranium mining waste; 5. Other mining waste; and 6. Oil and gas drilling muds and oil production brines.
214
EPA's primary reasoning was that these wastes occurred in particularly large volumes, the hazards were relatively low, and the wastes were not particularly amenable to control techniques for traditional facilities. 215 Somewhat contradictorily, EPA also stated that it had "very little information on the composition, characteristics, and the degree of hazard posed by these wastes."
216
In other words, even before the E&P waste exemption existed-indeed, while EPA was under a clear-cut mandate to identify and regulate all hazardous wastes-EPA was proposing ways in which it could avoid regulating E&P wastes under Subtitle C. As discussed supra, the lead-up to the Halliburton Loophole involved a very similar interplay between EPA and Congress. 217 In 1980, EPA finalized the rule and promulgated the E&P exemption regulation that still stands today.
218
It is worthwhile to note briefly the differences between the Subtitle C provisions, which apply only to wastes that are identified as hazardous, and the Subtitle D provisions, which apply to all other "solid wastes." Subtitle C contains stringent "cradle-to-grave" standards, which "regulate hazardous waste from its initial point of generation to its ultimate point of disposal (and beyond, if disposal leads to contamination of air, soil, or water)."
219
These standards apply to generators of hazardous waste, transporters, and facilities that treat, store, and dispose of hazardous waste (known as "TSDFs"). 220 EPA has primary authority to implement and enforce the Subtitle C program, but states may obtain authority to implement and enforce the program, with EPA's approval. 221 Solid waste that is not identified as hazardous waste-including those wastes that are "explicitly deemed not a hazardous waste," such as the "special wastes"-is regulated under Subtitle D rather than Subtitle C. 219. LUTHER, supra note 210, at 3. 220.
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While Subtitle C includes standards from cradle to grave, including transportation, treatment, and storage, Subtitle D primarily covers the disposal of solid waste. 223 Furthermore, while EPA has primary authority over the Subtitle C program, "EPA's authority to regulate solid waste under Subtitle D is limited." 224 EPA promulgates the Subtitle D regulations, including the standards distinguishing between permitted sanitary landfill facilities and prohibited "open dumping" of solid waste, but it is up to the individual states to implement and enforce these standards. 225 Because EPA cannot directly enforce the standards, and in fact cannot force states to adopt the standards, the Subtitle D regulations are written to be "self-implementing": that is, in a detailed enough manner that an operator of a disposal facility can read and comply with them. 226 In other words, the Subtitle D program is a much looser and less stringent program than the strict, "cradle-to-grave," and federally enforceable Subtitle C program.
Several months after EPA finalized its special wastes deferral in 1980, Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments, which followed on EPA's lead to amend RCRA with respect to these "special wastes."
227 Congress' decision to revisit RCRA was apparently driven by opinions both for and against EPA's deferral of the special wastes. On the one hand, regulation of special wastes under Subtitle C could lead to high costs to industry, "given uncertainties of risks associated with such wastes," as well as "conflicts with other federal law." 228 On the other hand, there were also concerns over the "precedent that would be set by giving preferential treatment to certain industries to be exempt from strict Subtitle C requirements." 229 The result of the debate was that Congress opted to enact EPA's special waste deferrals as statutory exemptions, at least temporarily. With respect to E&P wastes, the relevant provision is what has been called the "Bentsen Amendment," after its sponsor Senator Lloyd Bentsen, which exempted "drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy" from regulation under Subtitle C for at least two years. 230 
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Id In conjunction with this exemption, Congress required EPA to take three main actions. First, EPA would conduct a study on E&P wastes and transmit the resulting report to Congress two years after the enactment of the exemption-by October 1982. The study would consider the effects of E&P wastes on human health and the environment; "the adequacy of means and measures currently employed by" the oil and gas industry and government "to prevent or substantially mitigate such adverse effects"; and the alternatives to such measures, along with their costs. 231 Second, based on this study, EPA would determine either to regulate E&P wastes under Subtitle C's hazardous waste provisions or determine "that such regulations are unwarranted." 232 Third, EPA would transmit this determination, along with any necessary Subtitle C regulations, to Congress. The regulations would "take effect only when authorized by Act of Congress."
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Following Congress' enactment of the exemption, and in spite of the statutory deadline of October 1982, EPA did not actually complete and transmit the required Report to Congress until December 1987. 234 In fact, EPA only complied with this belated deadline after a nonprofit organization sued EPA for its violation of the deadline and entered into a consent decree with the agency.
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EPA followed on the report with its Regulatory Determination in July 1988, in which it determined that E&P wastes did not require regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA. 236 The Determination itself is an interesting document. First, while the Determination considers in detail "three key factors" relating to the oil and gas industry, the ultimate decision is based on six "reasons" that only partially overlap with these factors. 237 Most notably, the reasons do not include anything to do with the hazardous characteristics of E&P wastes. Second, EPA's actual analysis of the hazardous characteristics of E&P waste, within the major factors, is rife with contradictions, data gaps, and failures to assess certain waste streams. Above all, one comes away from the Determination with the sense that EPA approached the issue with great reluctance to regulate E&P wastes under Subtitle C. [VOL. 16 First, looking at the "reasons" versus the "factors," the three key factors EPA considered were the hazard assessment of E&P wastes, an economic impact analysis of Subtitle C regulations on the oil and gas industry, and the adequacy of existing federal and state laws and regulations. 238 EPA drew these factors from the Bentsen Amendment's required areas for coverage in the Report to Congress.
239
By contrast, EPA's six stated reasons for deciding not to regulate E&P wastes under Subtitle C were that (1) Subtitle C is not flexible enough to consider costs and avoid serious economic impacts to the industry; (2) Existing state and federal regulatory programs are "generally adequate" in controlling E&P wastes; (3) Subtitle C permitting would "hinder new facilities" and "disrupt[] the search for new oil and gas deposits;" (4) Subtitle C regulation would strain the capacity of existing Subtitle C facilities; (5) Subtitle C regulation would duplicate state authorities; and (6) Subtitle C regulation would impose a "permitting burden" on regulatory agencies.
240
What is most apparent from these reasons is that they overlap with only two of the "key factors"-the economic impact analysis and the adequacy of existing laws and regulations-but not the hazard assessment. EPA does not state in the reasons, for example, that E&P wastes are not hazardous enough to warrant regulation under Subtitle C. It partially makes this case within its analysis of the factors, as discussed infra, 241 but chooses to omit this when it gets to its actual reasoning. 242 In a certain way, these reasons are more of a policy argument against the entire Subtitle C framework than its specific application to E&P wastes. In fact, with minor edits, one could quite easily use these same reasons to exclude nearly any waste stream from regulation under Subtitle C.
Second, EPA's analysis of the key factors-and in particular the "hazard assessment" of E&P wastes-contains a numbers of gaps and contradictions that undermine the conclusions EPA reached. The problem is best encapsulated in what one commentator has called "the most overt contradiction" in the Regulatory Determination. That is, although EPA found the risks of E&P wastes to be "relatively low," this conclusion is contradicted by other findings of risk elsewhere in the Determination as 238 .
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There are parallels with EPA's 1996 decision not to add the oil and gas extraction industry to the TRI. In that instance, while EPA found that the industry certainly used and released large amounts of TRI-listed toxic chemicals, it similarly opted not to include the industry on the basis of other factors not related to this toxic nature. See supra Part II. A.
well as EPA's own admission that the study it relies on does not cover the predominance of the risks.
243
More specifically, EPA's analysis did not consider landspreading, roadspreading, disposal of associated wastes, or "storage of produced water in unlined pits"-all of which are major sources of risk and are directly relevant to whether E&P wastes should be managed "cradle to grave" or under the less-stringent standards of Subtitle D. 244 EPA itself conceded that these practices and waste streams "may pose higher risks" and "contain constituents that are similar in chemical composition and/or toxicity to other wastes currently regulated under RCRA Subtitle C." 245 Similarly, there were "vast uncertainties and statistical inaccuracies in the studies" that EPA relied upon.
246 From these studies, EPA could only "roughly estimate" how much E&P waste would be considered hazardous: "approximately 10 to 70 percent of large-volume wastes and 40 to 60 percent of associated wastes could potentially exhibit RCRA hazardous waste characteristics."
247 As Professor Cox stated, "[i]t is difficult to envision why a federal agency whose mission is to protect human health and the environment on the basis of scientific principles would attempt to draw any conclusions from data containing a range of uncertainty of 60%." 248 Another contradiction exists at the heart of the analysis of existing state and federal programs, which EPA found to be "generally adequate" and gave great weight in its determination that regulation under Subtitle C was unnecessary. 249 the management of oil and gas wastes.'" 251 In spite of these contradictions, gaps in the practices and wastes studied, and data quality issues-even by EPA's own admission-the agency saw fit to exempt a vast category of wastes from Subtitle C's cradle-to-grave controls.
One could conclude from this disjunctive mix of factors, reasons, and contradictions that EPA's decision was somehow influenced or that other forces were at play. Contemporaneous accounts support this conclusion.
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According to two EPA staff members, EPA leadership "relied on 'solely political reasons' to reject a staff recommendation that some oil and gas drilling wastes be more strictly regulated."
253 While the majority of an EPA staff working group apparently had recommended that a small category of E&P wastes be regulated as hazardous, "EPA Administrator Lee Thomas and J. Winston Porter, EPA's assistant administrator for solid waste and emergency response, . . . had decided that all oil and gas drilling wastes would remain exempt from hazardous waste rules," given that "removing any portion of the exemption would be too disruptive and burdensome to both the regulated industry and the regulating agencies." 254 The effect was that E&P wastes would remain exempt from regulation under Subtitle C, thereby leaving the previously promulgated regulatory exemption in place. 255 However, as a necessary component of this Determination, EPA stated that it would implement a "three-pronged approach toward filling the gaps in existing State and Federal programs that regulate the management of wastes from the crude oil, and natural gas, industries." 256 This approach would include working with the states to improve the strength and uniformity of their programs; working with Congress to secure any additional statutory authority; and, most importantly, improving federal authorities under the Clean Water Act, SDWA, and RCRA's Subtitle D regulations. 257 As to this last element, EPA laid out an extensive plan for how it would develop "tailored" Subtitle D standards that would "augment" the program and "focus on gaps in existing Id.
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Nearly three decades later, these tailored regulations still do not exist, nor is there any evidence that EPA took any action on them whatsoever. That is, EPA's announcement of this bold initiative appears to be its last word on it as well. No efforts to seek comments, collect data, or propose changes to the criteria at 40 C.F.R. Part 257 are apparent in the Federal Register or elsewhere. In fact, the only other time in which EPA formally addressed E&P wastes under RCRA again, it merely "clarified" the scope of oil and gas wastes exempted from Subtitle C, but did not discuss or even mention the status of efforts to tailor the Subtitle D regulations. 259 Other than this clarification, EPA has taken no official action on E&P wastes for 27 years.
B. Ways Forward: How EPA Can Work Within and Around the Bentsen Amendment
From this historical background, one can see that EPA has played a central role both in implementing and maintaining the Subtitle C exemption. While it is true that Congress enacted the Bentsen Amendment in 1980, EPA laid much of the groundwork leading up to that point and has since then done very little to improve the situation. Indeed, even after stating that the generic Subtitle D regulations are inadequate to handle the specific issues of E&P wastes and needed tailoring by EPA, the agency has taken no public action to make good on this promise.
With this history in mind, we turn to the second premise of this article: there is still much that EPA can do to improve the regulation of E&P wastes under RCRA. Unlike certain exemptions, EPA has a relatively large amount of unused power under the restrictions of the Bentsen Amendment. To rectify this issue, EPA envisioned tailored Subtitle D regulations that would focus primarily on "gaps in existing State and Federal regulations."
261 EPA flagged certain examples of these gaps, including the broad category of "associated wastes" and the management practices and facilities used for "large-volume wastes" (e.g., wastewater), such as roadspreading, landspreading, and impoundments. 262 A particular area of concern for EPA were centralized and commercial facilities that treat, store, and dispose of E&P wastes in concentrated form-and especially the pits and impoundments at these facilities. 263 Although the oil and gas industry has changed greatly between 1988 and the present, all of these facilities and practices continue to remain issues for surrounding individuals, communities, and the environment.
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If EPA wished to promulgate these tailored regulations, it could begin immediately. There is nothing in the Bentsen Amendment constraining EPA's ability to regulate E&P wastes under Subtitle D. In fact, the opposite is true: EPA has an ongoing duty to review and, if necessary, revise the regulations. Under the requirements of section 2002(b) of RCRA, each regulation "shall be reviewed and, where necessary, revised not less frequently than every three years."
265 Given EPA's determination in 1988 that revisions to the Subtitle D regulations were necessary and its stated intention to undertake these revisions, the agency was required to have completed these necessary revisions by July 6, 1991 at the latest.
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Even if EPA had not determined revisions to the Subtitle D regulations to be necessary, it would still be in violation of the requirements of section 2002(b), as it has failed to review the Subtitle D regulations for oil and gas wastes for almost nine successive three-year deadlines. As one court has stated with respect to EPA's dereliction of another statute's similar "ongoing, periodic review and revision" requirements, "EPA has not merely missed a deadline, it has nullified the congressional scheme for a fixed interval review and revision process." Another option is for EPA to revisit the Subtitle C exemption and determine that E&P wastes should be regulated under Subtitle C. This is the
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See "most obvious means" for EPA to achieve clear-cut regulation of E&P wastes under RCRA, as well as the preferred mechanism from the perspective of greatest environmental protection. 268 That being said, there are also more complexities involved with revisiting the Subtitle C exemption, given the Bentsen Amendment's provision that Subtitle C "regulations shall take effect only when authorized by Act of Congress." 269 Although this provision is connected to the time-specific Report to Congress and Regulatory Determination provisions, some have interpreted this as imposing an ongoing requirement that any Subtitle C regulations at any point in the future require the consent of Congress. 270 For this reason, achieving regulation of E&P wastes under Subtitle C may be "the most difficult [option] to achieve politically." 271 With that in mind, there are several initiatives and options to achieve Subtitle C regulation of E&P wastes.
First, in 2010, the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") submitted a rulemaking petition to EPA requesting that the agency initiate proceedings to revisit the Subtitle C exemption and to promulgate necessary regulations. 272 In the petition, NRDC noted that "EPA never intended the Regulatory Determination to be its final word on E&P waste"; that EPA had failed to implement the Determination's promised "three-pronged plan," which included the never-realized tailored Subtitle D regulations; and the growing regulatory gaps in the decades since the Determination.
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NRDC's petition included, in particular, the toxicity of various E&P wastes, including fracking fluids, wastewater, drill cuttings, and associated wastes; 274 a survey of the gaps and weaknesses in existing state regulatory mechanisms; 275 and an analysis demonstrating that E&P wastes meet RCRA's criteria for "hazardous waste." 276 Over four years later, EPA has failed to issue a formal response to the petition.
Second, there are numerous wastes associated with the oil and gas industry that fall outside the Bentsen Amendment and can be regulated under Subtitle C. As EPA clarified in 1993, for a waste to be exempt from regulation under Subtitle C, "it must be associated with operations to locate or remove oil or gas from the ground or to remove impurities from such substances and it must be intrinsic to and uniquely associated with oil and gas exploration, development or production operations." 277 Since that time, EPA has expanded on the types of wastes that are not "intrinsic to" and "uniquely associated with" exploration and production. For example, "lubricants and solvents" produced at other industrial facilities are not exempt, nor are used synthetic pit liners, as many other types of operations use such liners as well. 278 These are both significant clarifications, given that solvents and lubricants often have hazardous characteristics, and the disposal of used pit liners on site-contaminated with whatever E&P solid and liquid wastes occupied the pits-is historically a common industry practice. 279 Perhaps even more significantly, EPA has clarified that the exemption does not apply to "unused products that are leaked and spilled, such as unused drilling mud or fracturing fluid spilled on the ground." 280 Indeed, "exempt wastes may be regulated if they are mixed with non-exempt wastes. For example, storage of produced/flowback waters would generally be regulated if commingled with a listed hazardous waste." 281 This is a very large area outside the exemption, as there are many incidents involving spilling of fracking fluids, drilling muds, and other products prior to their use. 282 Similarly, if fracking wastewater, which is often stored and reused in future fracking operations, is mixed with unused fracking fluids, lubricants, or solvents, this entire commingled waste should fall outside the exemption until it is used. This is significant, as it should allow the full range of Subtitle C controls for storage and handling to be applied to certain areas of oil and gas operations, such as tanks and impoundments. If EPA is willing to employ this authority, it has far greater power over oil and gas operations than it currently uses.
A third option-albeit outside of EPA's hands-is the Closing Loopholes and Ending Arbitrary and Needless Evasion of Regulations ("CLEANER") Act, which was introduced by Representative Matt Cartwright in the 113th Congress in 2013. 283 If enacted, the Act would have removed the Bentsen Amendment, required EPA to revisit the Subtitle C exemption within one year, and required EPA to promulgate Subtitle D regulations pertaining to facilities that "receive drilling fluids, produced waters, or other wastes associated with" oil and gas exploration and production within one year. 284 Although the bill "died in committee" and did not receive a vote by the U.S. House of Representatives, there is a chance that Representative Cartwright could reintroduce the CLEANER Act in the current Congress. 285 
C. Learning from Experience: Coal Ash and the Bevill Amendment
If EPA decides to move forward on regulating E&P wastes, one advantage it has is that it will not be starting from scratch. On December 19, 2014, EPA finalized tailored Subtitle D regulations for coal combustion waste (also known as "coal ash"). 286 Although the regulatory framework and history for coal ash under RCRA is slightly different than for E&P wastes, there are enough similarities to give EPA guidance on how to proceed with promulgating tailored Subtitle D regulations for E&P wastes-as well as the regulatory delays and pitfalls it should seek to avoid this time around.
Like E&P wastes, EPA categorized coal ash as a "special waste" in 1978 and deferred regulating it under Subtitle C. 287 Congress followed on this deferral in 1980 by exempting coal ash under the Bentsen Amendment's counterpart, the Bevill Amendment. 288 The main difference between the two amendments is that the Bevill Amendment does not include the Bentsen Amendment's requirement that any necessary Subtitle C regulations be authorized by an act of Congress. 289 Unlike E&P wastes, which have had a relatively simple history of the 1987 Report to Congress and the 1988 Regulatory Determination, EPA's determinations and rulemakings for coal ash have had a number of starts and stops over the years. For coal ash, EPA submitted two Reports to Congress, in 1988 and 1999, each followed by a separate Regulatory Determination, in 1993 and 2000. 290 Under both Regulatory Determinations, EPA decided to keep the Subtitle C exemption in placealthough the 2000 Determination apparently reached this conclusion only after review and revision of the draft Determination by the White House Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). 291 Like the E&P Regulatory Determination, the 2000 coal ash Regulatory Determination concluded that revision to Subtitle D regulations for coal ash landfills and impoundments would be appropriate. 292 Also like the E&P Regulatory Determination, EPA made no immediate move to act on this conclusion. It was only after a Tennessee Valley Authority coal ash impoundment released over one billion gallons of coal ash slurry in December 2008-and subsequent public outcry-that EPA finally decided to revisit its conclusion. 293 In June 2010, after nearly seven months of revision by OMB, EPA released its proposed regulations. 294 While EPA initially planned to propose regulations under Subtitle C, OMB's revisions resulted in a unique proposed rule with "two alternative regulations": one in which EPA would lift the exemption and regulate under Subtitle C, and one in which it would promulgate tailored regulations under Subtitle D. 295 Fearing additional years of delay, a coalition of environmental groups filed a lawsuit against EPA under the section 2002(b) deadline provision of RCRA, requesting the court to set a deadline for EPA's final revision of the rules. 296 After a ruling by the court in favor of the groups, EPA entered a consent decree with the groups in early 2014. 297 On December 19, 2014, over two decades from its first Regulatory Determination, 14 years since its second Regulatory Determination, and almost exactly six years since the disaster in Tennessee, EPA promulgated tailored regulations for coal ash under Subtitle D of RCRA. 298 Members of Congress have already promised bills to block the new rule, and litigation is likely. 299 Nonetheless, coal ash stands as the first "special waste" to have achieved tailored regulations under Subtitle D of RCRA.
There are several lessons one can take from the long history of the coal ash rulemaking. For one, EPA has the ability, both legally and pragmatically, to promulgate tailored Subtitle D regulations for special wastes. While there are political and institutional forces that will inevitably push back against such regulations, EPA ultimately can get these regulations done. Additionally, these same forces have made regulation of special wastes under Subtitle C an apparent nonstarter for the near future.
The final lesson is that EPA has a duty to make these revisions. EPA conceded as much in the lawsuit, and the court agreed, following a long line of case law. 300 Once EPA has determined that revisions are necessary, as it did for E&P wastes and coal ash, these revisions are due within three years. In cases where EPA has not yet made such a determination, it must at the very least review the regulations every three years to ascertain whether such a revision is necessary. If it determines that revision is necessary, it has not earned a reprieve from the deadline; both review and any necessary revision must occur within the three-year window.
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Of the three exemptions and exclusions investigated in this article, the exemption of E&P wastes is the most complicated. While Congress enacted the exemption, at least temporarily, it also left EPA with the possibility of undoing it, as well as unrestricted power to regulate the wastes under its non-hazardous Subtitle D. Through this background and power, one can see both of this article's premises at play.
First, EPA has played a central role in laying the groundwork for Congress to enact the Bentsen Amendment and then in keeping the exemption in place as enacted for 35 years. EPA created the deferral for "special wastes" when it had unrestricted power under RCRA, and Congress used the agency's reasoning to enact the deferral as the Bentsen and Bevill Amendments. In its Regulatory Determination, EPA opted to leave the exemption in place on the grounds that it could craft necessary regulations under its unaffected Subtitle D powers to regulate E&P wastes properly. But the record shows no further action by EPA on this promise.
Second, unlike certain exemptions, EPA has a relatively large amount of unused power under the restrictions of the Bentsen Amendment. There is no question that EPA has the power to promulgate the tailored Subtitle D regulations. EPA has a clear guide forward through its recent promulgation of Subtitle D regulations for coal ash, another of the "special wastes." The only obstacle toward taking this action for E&P wastes is EPA's own political will.
CONCLUSION
The oil and gas industry has a unique amount of exemptions and exclusions from our environmental laws, and these exemptions and exclusions have stood for far too long. With the modern oil and gas production boom, the industry's toxic footprint and environmental impacts have increased many times over, and the continued exemptions now have a greater cost on our environmental and public health.
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Toward the goal of ending or lessening the burden of these exemptions and exclusions, this article has sought to demonstrate two key points. First, Congress enacted each of these provisions, but EPA has played a key role in laying the groundwork, making the case for their enactment, and most importantly maintaining these exemptions and exclusions for decades. Where Congress left EPA the regulatory power to undo the exemptions, EPA has failed to use this power. Where Congress left EPA with the ability to regulate some aspect of the industry's practices and impacts outside the exemption, such as in SDWA, EPA has also failed to act.
Second, in connection with these points, there is much more that can be done without the action of Congress. While the best-case scenario certainly would be one in which Congress has a change of heart and opts to repeal its exemptions, this is not the only way forward. None of these exemptions is absolute. Each of these exemptions and exclusions either leaves a regulatory "escape hatch" that EPA has authority to use, such as promulgating tailored Subtitle D regulations under RCRA or adding the oil and gas extraction industry to the TRI, or leaves EPA and the delegated state agencies with remaining areas of authority, such as regulating fracking with diesel under SDWA.
As with the history leading to these exemptions and keeping them in place, the responsibility for their solution is in EPA's hands.
